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Critical Dialogue
The Politics of War Powers: The Theory and History of
Presidential Unilateralism. By Sarah Burns. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2019. 328p. $27.95 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592720003291

— Jasmine Farrier

, University of Louisville
j.farrier@louisville.edu

In the ﬁrst half of 2020, impeachment, COVID-19,
Black Lives Matter, and the upcoming presidential election knocked forever wars even farther oﬀ our radar.
According to Gallup’s “Most Important Problem” polling, over the past six months, national security, terrorism,
and international aﬀairs in general registered less than
0.5% of mentions in the national sample. And yet Sarah
Burns’s new book is as relevant as it would have been if
public opinion still cared about war as much as it did in
the ﬁrst decade of this century. Although this book,
published in 2019, obviously could not include these
timely 2020 subjects, it is indirectly relevant to them.
When is the reckoning going to come for the dysfunctions of the modern presidency that simultaneously
abuses and squanders power across various issues? When
will Congress ever again embrace the fullness of its
constitutional authority to stop executive branch actions
that majorities decry and see to completion a diﬀerent
agenda that members ran on and won?
A recap of just a few facts about the longest-running
military actions in US history shows that these questions
are not mere handwringing exercises. Political science
needs more books on war, from a variety of research
approaches, to bring attention to the chasm between
separation of powers theory and reality that has little to
do with which party is in power.
The United States passed two Authorizations for the
Use of Military Force (AUMFs) in 2001 and 2002.
Although aimed at Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively,
three presidents used these open-ended war authorizations in at least 14 countries. According to the Costs of
War project at the Watson Institute for International and
Public Aﬀairs at Brown University, 7,000 US service
members have died related to these wars, thousands more
private contractors were killed, and the United States and
its allies have caused at least 335,000 civilian deaths
across Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan.
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Unrelenting war in the region has also created a refugee
crisis counted at around 8.4 million, as well as an untold
number of wounded civilians and combatants across all
these countries, as well as the United States. Costs of War
project director Professor Neta Crawford and her research
team estimate that the United States has spent or obligated almost $6.5 trillion for the direct costs of these
military operations—largely through issuing public debt.
Yes, these facts matter for a variety of raging political and
policy ﬁres today that require federal dollars and
competence.
Burns’s book does not squarely focus on these aspects
of “politics” as much as on the crisis in our constitutional polity that has repeatedly undermined successful
war policies. The book is grounded in constitutional
theories of separation of powers, with an emphasis on
John Locke and Baron Montesquieu. Burns aims to
explain how executive branch institutional development
on war and national security repeatedly “warps” founding theories by skewing to Locke, ﬁrst intermittently
and then eventually in a permanent way, which now
permanently distorts constitutional values of deliberation and accountability on war. In eﬀect, the
“politics”-related insights of the book concern the
bizarre lack of politics surrounding war. Burns shows
that, no matter the partisan or electoral landscape of the
past seven decades, unilateral decision-making to
embark on new military actions is always in fashion at
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue; this is despite whatever
positions or promises the presidential candidates may
have made while running. Simultaneously, congressional majorities of all stripes are content with sometimes waving ﬂags and other times wagging ﬁngers. No
serious eﬀort to repeal or replace the two AUMFs have
come to the ﬂoors of the US House and Senate.
Burns explains on the book’s ﬁrst page that delving into
constitutional theories of separation of powers is important because the founders wanted a stable constitutional
order— not a country that hewed solely to one individual
leader’s personality, background, interests, and the like.
Executive branch domination on any policy front therefore undermines constitutional ideas of systemic “ballast”
through shared power and constitutionally derived diﬀerences in the outlook of the branches. Burns dislikes the
fact that executive unilateralism depends on individual
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character traits, but the electoral college was supposed to
be an elaborate ﬁltration system that would bring us far
more George Washingtons than Donald Trumps. Even a
casual reading of the Federalist Papers reveals the authors’
commitment to a virtuous oﬃce that sees the nation’s
interest in a holistically superior way to the House and
Senate. Congress was somehow supposed to maintain
robust institutional ambition despite being cleaved into
two chambers of independently elected or appointed
members. The House and Senate were designed explicitly
not to function as a cohesive body on a regular basis, but
Congress held its own for a variety of complex reasons
until the mid-twentieth century.
Chapters 2–4 elaborate on the philosophical foundation and early debates that led to the creation of this second
US Constitution. Chapter 2 delves into the arguments and
inﬂuence of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, which
advocates structural elements of “moderation” in modern
states. Burns explores and eventually contrasts this main
idea with that of Lockean executive “prerogative,” which
can backﬁre on state stability when used mindlessly and
continually. Chapter 3 explains how, in the wake of the
American Revolution, leaders’ “limited knowledge of the
separation of powers,” among other blind spots, “led to the
creation of a structurally ﬂawed confederacy” under the
decentralized Articles of Confederation (p. 49). As Burns
sees it, Madison understood Montesquieu and jousted
with the more Lockean Hamilton even as both advocated
together for more robust national government authority.
Chapter 4 brings these points into a more molecular focus
on the debates between the Federalists and Antifederalists
that often centered on the latter group’s collective fear of
unrestrained executive power, especially on war (which
seems remarkably prescient when read now). This chapter
delves into several Federalist Papers, but for some reason
does not dwell on No. 69, in which Hamilton clashed with
prominent Antifederalists, including the governor of
New York, whom he chides for having more power to
direct his state militia than the proposed presidential
oﬃce, which would have to wait for legislative war
authorization.
Chapters 5 and 6 then march through presidential war
history from George Washington through William
McKinley, with reference to a combination of secondary
accounts and original primary sources, to label various
presidents as hewing closer to the Locke or Montesquieu
side of the power spectrum. This approach matters
because “the Lockean system relies more heavily than
the Montesquieuan or American system on the virtues
of those in power and of the citizens” (p. 94). Chapter 5
also reminds all of us who research and teach on war
powers to reread the “Neutrality Proclamation” debates
and history to ponder the fact that the same men who
participated in writing the Constitution disagreed on the
actual nature of presidential powers. Throughout these

chapters, when presidents see Congress as an optional
partner or hindering nuisance, they are on Team Locke
(surprisingly including Jeﬀerson, but less surprisingly
including Polk). If presidents welcome and engage constitutional principles through the House and Senate,
Burns places them on Team Montesquieu (Madison and
McKinley). Of course, Burns also explains why some
presidents, such as Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts, deserve much more nuanced treatment—and
those parts of the book are worth reading especially closely,
because ambivalent (read Montesquieuan) war presidents
seem to have weaker legacies.
Chapters 7 and 8 cover the birth of the modern
presidency in the two world wars and the Cold War,
and then chapters 9–11 explain why the implosion of
the USSR did not change either party’s constitutional
orientation to national security. Building on the work of
other prominent institutional scholars on the separation
of powers, Burns critiques the permanent Lockean
model embraced by Harry Truman onward. She is
especially insightful and original in her searing critique
of the current war on terrorism, which lacked cultural
literacy, military strategy, and deep, consistent congressional deliberation and oversight. These chapters are
also tied together by the extraordinary (and littleknown) power of the Oﬃce of Legal Counsel (OLC)
in the Department of Justice. Presidents from FDR on
have relied on this oﬃce of naked institutional partisanship that is “a tool for presidents when they hoped for a
legal justiﬁcation to circumvent congressional
restraints” (p. 147). The ﬁnal chapters on the current
strategic military abyss forged by George W. Bush,
Barack Obama, and Donald Trump bring home the
dire and unintended consequences of military blunders
forged under this narrow perspective.
Notwithstanding these numerous strengths, throughout the book—even when returning repeatedly to the
real-world policy implications of separation-of-powers
distortions—Burns neglects one-third of the constitutional ballast: federal courts. Louis Fisher explains in
Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power: Unconstitutional Leanings (2017) that from the erroneous dicta
of the infamous Curtiss-Wright decision through today,
all three branches often have misunderstood their own
and other branches’ powers. And as my most recent
book argues, federal courts are a crucial piece of the
constitutional war puzzle, both when they take up cases
and when they demur through a variety of justiciability
tools. If Congress pepped up, federal courts could do a
bit more to bolster the constitutional distribution of war
powers and ﬁnd a way to support the misguided War
Powers Resolution of 1973. Until then, Federalist 51
remains a modern-day fairy tale. Thus, one might ask
what role Burns thinks the judicial branch has played—
and ought to play—in redressing the problem of
December 2020 | Vol. 18/No. 4
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executive overreach with respect to the United States’
seemingly endless wars.
Response to Jasmine Farrier’s Review of The Politics of
War Powers: The Theory and History of Presidential
Unilateralism
doi:10.1017/S153759272000328X

— Sarah Burns

Studying the separation of powers is disheartening at
best. Understanding how members of Congress became
so ambivalent, the executive became so unilateral, and
the courts acquiesced to this imbalance requires the
acceptance of an unhealthy constitutional order that
shows no sign of improvement. Jasmine Farrier and I
took diﬀerent approaches to these issues. We diagnose
the same problems, but we diverge on which parts of
the dysfunction to address and how to address them. In
her book, she carefully examines the three branches
over the course of several decades to demonstrate how
diﬀerent branches have contributed to the current state
of aﬀairs. As Farrier points out in her review of The
Politics of War Powers, I do not discuss judicial decisions
or the reasoning of judges who have decided to avoid
weighing in on many political questions. I think this is a
valid critique, and I hope I can address why I did not
discuss it.
My reason for this exclusion relates to the very situation
she demonstrates in her work. Despite major changes to
the balance of power between the executive and legislative
branches in the realm of foreign aﬀairs, with a few
exceptions federal judges refuse to hear cases brought by
members of Congress who ask the judiciary to constrain
presidential unilateralism. For better or worse, they leave
the political branches to sort out the dispute themselves,
occasionally telling the plaintiﬀs that Congress possesses
the formal powers needed to address executive overreach.
Because of this state of aﬀairs, the judiciary does not
ﬁgure into the central concern of my book: the failure of
Congress to impose serious constraints on the executive,
which has caused signiﬁcant problems at home and
abroad. At home, it has warped the constitutional system
to the point where the idea of serious deliberation about
what kind of operation and what would constitute a
successful conclusion of military operations has fallen by
the wayside. Abroad, it has allowed poorly developed and
poorly executed policy to have a detrimental impact on
various countries, and it has failed to improve national
security. The imbalance and the problems it causes have
been the state of aﬀairs for more than 70 years, and there
are no signs of improvement. Understanding why that
happened and why it persists is a central focus of my work.
Seeing how the imbalance grew over the course of the
1182
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twentieth century (especially during the Cold War) provides further evidence that the problem is not, strictly
speaking, a constitutional one. Before the United States
entered World War II, members of Congress had the
capacity to hold presidents accountable, and more importantly, they did. On paper, it is therefore constitutionally
possible for Congress to display the bipartisanship and
branch unity needed to pass a bill that would constrain the
executive and survive the inevitable presidential veto.
Although it is not likely, it is possible. At present, the
United States is merely experiencing the kind of imbalance
that regularly imperils developed liberal democracies.
There is, however, a point of no return.
Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial: Congressional
Lawsuits and the Separation of Powers. By Jasmine Farrier.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019. 198p. $115.00 cloth, $29.95
paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592720003709

— Sarah Burns, Rochester Institute of Technology
smbgsm@rit.edu

Jasmine Farrier’s work demonstrates the incredible
restraint among judges in the federal system when it comes
to addressing separation-of-powers questions, especially
when members of Congress bring suits against the president. After providing historical context by referencing The
Federalist Papers and early court decisions, the work
focuses on cases from the 1970s onward. Before Nixon’s
unprecedented actions, members of Congress had never
asked the courts to help them restrain presidents.
Although this change may seem reasonable, Farrier eﬀectively demonstrates that congressional members’ eﬀorts in
the 1970s and future eﬀorts to seek help from the courts
reveals a dysfunctional system that the judiciary cannot ﬁx.
She argues that Congress has shirked its duties and delegated its prerogatives to the president. Judges agree but
demonstrate a strong reluctance to solve the legislature’s
problem for them.
In several instances, justices state plainly that Congress
has a means of restraining the president—namely through
legislation—but they do not use that tool eﬀectively. The
actions of Congress have caused an imbalance between the
political branches, and Congress no longer has the capacity
to repair it. For example, when explaining why she dismissed the case in Conyers v. Reagan (1984) District Judge
Green wrote, “If plaintiﬀs are successful in persuading
their colleagues about the wrongfulness of the President’s
actions, they will be provided the remedy they presently
seek from this Court. If plaintiﬀs are unsuccessful in their
eﬀorts, it would be unwise for this Court to scrutinize that
determination and interfere with the operations of the
Congress” (quoted on p. 43).

Despite consistently receiving decisions like Green’s,
members of Congress continue to ask the judiciary to
restrain presidential overreach rather than using their
legislative tools. Farrier addresses this puzzle through
interviews with some individuals who participated in the
lawsuits. In an interview with some of the plaintiﬀs in
Campbell v. Clinton (1999), Farrier discovers that “the
lawsuit was designed to bring public attention to Congress’s ‘lack of will’ to confront President Clinton on war”
(p. 48). The plaintiﬀs felt compelled to use this route to
gain attention because they knew they could not use their
branch’s prerogatives. As the plaintiﬀs note, despite the
broad consensus among both parties that presidents overreach, especially in military aﬀairs, “war brings…institutional disinterest” (as quoted on p. 48).
In the speciﬁc area of war powers, modern courts avoid
deﬁnitive answers—with a few exceptions—despite the
incredibly broad interpretation of executive powers
adopted by presidents of both parties. The reserve of
federal judges is even more perplexing after examining
the historical evidence. As Farrier notes, Federalist 51
implies that a “healthy separation of powers system
requires peaceful but consistent interinstitutional
combat,” and the Constitution does not state or imply
that questions of war powers are oﬀ-limits to the courts
(p. 5). Furthermore, courts adjudicated war powers cases
until at least the Mexican American war by tracing presidential power back to congressional authorization. Modern courts have therefore abandoned earlier practice and
switched from requiring presidents to prove they have
permission to go to war to requiring Congress to proactively restrain presidents from doing so, which requires
achieving a supermajority that will overcome a veto from
the White House. Farrier demonstrates how these changes
occurred over the course of three major wars culminating
in Truman’s constitutionally suspect decision to initiate
the Korean War.
That move was the ﬁrst time a president unilaterally
initiated a large-scale military operation—and Congress
let him. It may have been helpful in this section if Farrier
had brieﬂy addressed why the Cold War caused such a
dramatic shift among all of the branches, with special
attention to the motivation of the federal courts during a
lengthy period of heightened insecurity. This would be
especially enlightening in the case of the Korean War.
Why did Congress agree to fund the war after failing to
authorize it? Why did they not appeal to the courts, in this
instance, as they did during Nixon’s presidency?
As Stephen Griﬃn notes in Long Wars and the Constitution (2013), the shift in the balance of power during the
Cold War is akin to a constitutional amendment. For that
reason, the “peaceful but consistent interinstitutional
combat” gave way to an imperial president, a supine
Congress, and a Court burdened by a more clearly
“deﬁned… political question doctrine” after Baker

v. Carr (1962) (p. 5). Including a section addressing
how Cold War federal judges saw their role in the shifting
balance between the other branches would have greatly
increased the reader’s understanding of why this occurred
and what role the courts played.
Farrier’s discussion of the important cases of the era
hints at an assessment of judicial acquiescence to the new
balance of power, as she demonstrates how such cases
helped presidents continue to overreach as Congress failed
to check them. This was compounded after the passage of
the War Powers Resolution (1973) when we see the turn
toward requiring Congress to restrain presidents, rather
than requiring presidents to have prior congressional
authorization.
Another meaningful contribution of the work is her
examination of these cases at the lower levels. However, it
may have been valuable for Farrier to have a brief discussion of why she included certain lower-level cases and
which judges she quoted from them. This would provide
insight into why the lower-level judges appeared more
friendly toward Congress. Does Farrier think those judges
had a more accurate interpretation of their judicial powers
and of what burden should fall on whom? This approach
might have shed more light on why these were included
rather than other possible cases. At the highest level, with
remarkable consistency, judges dismiss cases brought by
members of Congress against presidents. What accounts
for this change once a case reaches the Supreme Court?
Interestingly, the partisanship of judges does not seem
to aﬀect their decisions, especially on foreign policy questions. As Farrier notes, “Whatever the motivations of
federal judges who have formed these multilayered barriers
around war powers, the consistency of the judicial position
deﬁes ideological polarization” (p. 51). Just as the interviews with plaintiﬀs meaningfully contribute to the book,
having interviews with judges would also have provided
interesting insights. Why do they adjudicate so consistently on these questions? For instance, Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Regan (1984) looks like a case in which members of
Congress should have prevailed. It would have been
engaging to have a better sense of why the judges in this
case seemed overly cautious and what motivated them.
Despite demonstrating that modern courts put a heavy
burden on a dysfunctional Congress, Farrier proves that
courts cannot solve the problem. Instead, the very fact that
Congress asks courts for assistance allows (1) presidents to
implicitly win when the court dismisses the case and
(2) risks the possibility of a very pro-presidency decision.
The problem goes even deeper. In addition to losing their
ability to counter the “ambition” of the executive, Congress shows “two sides” that “are often in tension: a drive to
protect constituents and counterintuitively, a drive to shed
institutional power” (p. 89). Her discussion of the
decision-making process used to determine what military
bases to close in the 1990s is particularly illuminating.
December 2020 | Vol. 18/No. 4
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In addition to delegating powers, Congresses also
imposes “a variety of legislative process obstacles.” These,
according to Farrier, are “self-inﬂicted wounds” (p. 93).
When combined with the fact that “presidential unilateralism is often supported by all branches through overt
approval or tepid opposition” (p. 98), Farrier has ample
evidence that “it seems all three branches are working
against Congress” (p. 93).
Unfortunately, this dysfunctional system is here to stay,
barring a major catalytic event like the Great Depression or
the Cold War (that does not reinforce the current imbalance). Farrier has diagnosed the problem eﬀectively and
explored it thoroughly. After examining the systemic
problems, one must ask, Does she think the dysfunction
is so deep that there are no solutions worth oﬀering? It
would have been interesting to explore what a judicial shift
would do to the balance of power among the political
branches. As Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin note in
Democracy and Dysfunction (2019), judges alter the way
they interpret the Constitution in diﬀerent eras. Is it
possible that judges could shift toward providing Congress
with more support? This would not eliminate the problem, but perhaps this change and some other reforms
could slowly start a rebalancing between the political
branches, especially in the realm of foreign policy.
Except for these few minor questions, I think this book
makes an excellent and unique contribution to a very wellresearched ﬁeld. A number of audiences will beneﬁt from
reading Farrier’s careful analysis of American constitutionalism and the separation of powers.
Response to Sarah Burns’s Review of Constitutional
Dysfunction on Trial: Congressional Lawsuits and the
Separation of Powers
doi:10.1017/S1537592720003710

— Jasmine Farrier

I am grateful for Daniel O’Neill’s invitation to engage in
this critical dialogue and also for Sarah Burns’s insightful
review of my book.
One important area of questioning that Sarah Burns
raises concerns the broadest of all topics: “Why”? Why has
Congress allowed presidential/executive branch power to
grow regarding extant and potential national security
threats? Why is the delegation of power relatively stable
across diﬀerent partisan and policy eras? She is correct that
my book could take up that question more centrally.
Looking at the literature in a broad way (spanning
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Ackerman to Zeisberg), we know that there are a variety
of explanations for these stubborn trends. The most
convincing of those explanations include electoral indifference to legislative abdication, lack of institutional maintenance from House/Senate leadership, and the fright of
twentieth- and twenty-ﬁrst-century technologies of war
that may require rapid response.
Another area of the book that Burns would have liked to
see expanded is the nature of the lower courts’ decisions in
member lawsuits. Again, I heartily agree that this is fertile
ground for additional research and more dedicated focus.
Are lower federal court judges more courageous—sometimes taking up robust defenses of members’ claims? Or
are they penned in by hewing to precedent and (consciously or not) their own ambitions of promotion to a
higher level, which could be damaged by anti-presidential
opinions? Burns is on to something here. Several years ago
when I began the project, I had dreams of extended
appendices that would include the president’s name/party
and US Senate majority at the time of the federal judge’s
appointment, as well as the president’s party, congressional majority, and type of holding for every member case
that came to each judge. A pilot of that database on war
powers cases compiled by an undergraduate researcher that
I supervised showed that there was no predictive quality to
these data points. I remain intrigued by the idea that there
is an elegant way to display these variables for future
researchers who remain skeptical that war is a corner of
jurisprudence not tainted by partisan and ideological
polarization.
This point leads to Burns’s ﬁnal suggestion for additional work. What if federal judges took a greater interest
(and heavier hand) in congressional lawsuits? Would
these judges help heal or further inﬂame the United
States’ dysfunctional separation-of-powers system? As
Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial explains, judicial
restraint is akin to executive branch victories, because it
sends members back to their legislative chambers to pass
disapprovals of delegations of power that may not have
been authorized in the ﬁrst place—and then try to muster
supermajorities to overcome certain presidential vetoes.
Federal judges take these precedents and build a wall
under the not-very-compelling judicial default of, in
eﬀect, “we do not take these types of cases because…we
do not take these types of cases.” As we face another
semester of teaching the outdated separation-of-powers
fantasy called Federalist 51, we can be forgiven if we
wonder why only one of three branches appears to relish
ﬂexing institutional muscle.

